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Immigrant-trade links, transplanted
home bias and network effects
Roger White
Department of Economics, Franklin and Marshall College, PO Box 3003,
Lancaster, PA 17604-3003, USA
E-mail: rwhite@fandm.edu
Macro-level data for the US and 73 trading partners spanning the years
1980 to 2001 is used with a gravity specification to investigate the influence
of immigration on bilateral trade. Prior research has identified immigrant
stocks as a significant determinant of trade; however, this study indicates
that the US immigrant-trade link is driven by immigration from relatively
low income countries. A 10% increase in the immigrant stock is found to
generate respectively 4.7 and 1.5% increases in domestic imports from and
exports to the typical low income home country. The observed link is
decomposed into two hypothesized channels – network effects and
transplanted home bias. Considerable variation in per-immigrant trade
effects is found across home countries: imports from the typical low
income home country are estimated to increase by up to $2057 due to
transplanted home bias and by as much as $2967 as a result of network
effects, while exports rise by up to $910 as a result of networks.
I. Introduction
In recent decades, the US has increasingly opened
to the global economy. The sum of imports and
exports more than doubled between 1970 and 2001,
from 8.1 to 18.5% of US Gross Domestic Product.
The ratio of US-owned assets abroad to US GDP
increased from 0.16 to 0.61 while foreign-owned US
assets relative to US GDP increased from 0.10 to
0.81 (US Bureau of the Census, 1985, 2000, 2003).
Increased immigration has coincided with
increased trade and capital flows. As integration
continues, immigration is expected to remain high on
policy agendas.1 This article, provides a deeper
understanding of the immigrant-trade relationship,
which may benefit future public policy formulation.2
Gould (1994), examining the US, first reports an
immigrant-trade link. Head and Ries (1998), Blanes-
Cristobal (2002), Girma and Yu (2002), and Bryant
et al. (2004) report links for Canada, the UK, Spain
and New Zealand, respectively. Combes et al. (2005)
find internal migration increases intra-France trade.
Co et al. (2004) and Dunlevy (2004) report immigra-
tion leads to increased US state exports. I extend
the literature by considering heterogeneity in immi-
grant-trade links across home countries, distilling
links into operative channels and estimating propor-
tional, aggregate and per-immigrant trade effects.
1 The foreign-born population increased from 6.2% of the total population in 1980 to 11.7% in 2001 (US INS, 2003; US
Bureau of the Census, 2004).
2 I follow the US Immigration and Naturalization Service and define an immigrant as a person lawfully admitted for
permanent residence in the US (US INS, 2003).
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The Heckscher–Ohlin–Samuelson model, and
specifically the Factor Price Equalization Theorem,
implies that trade and immigration are substitutes.
If economic considerations drive migration, large
and persistent earnings differentials between nations
may induce migration. However, if trade equalizes
factor returns then reduced earnings differentials
may discourage emigration.3 If non-economic factors
spur emigration, trade will have a negligible impact.
Market imperfections, such as incomplete markets
or information asymmetries, provide rationale for
immigration and trade to act as complements.
Immigrants may enter the host country with
preferences for goods that are unavailable, thus
potentially increasing host country imports from the
home country. I refer to this channel as ‘transplanted
home bias’.4 Also, immigrants may arrive with
business contacts or knowledge of political or social
obligations required to conduct business in the
home country (Globerman, 2001). If such
connections reduce transaction costs, both host
country exports to and imports from the home
country may increase. I refer to this second channel
as ‘network effects’.5
Greater US-home country dissimilarity implies
fewer domestically available substitutes and an
increased probability that transplanted home bias
affects trade. Similarly, assuming high income
nations have developed markets and contracting
procedures and that low-income nations have less
complete markets and weaker contracting and
enforcement mechanisms, it is likely immigrants
from lower-income nations present opportunities
for increased trade.6 To address the possibility,
I stratify the sample by income class (World Bank,
1997).7 Section II discusses the specification.
Section III presents data sources and variables.
Section IV presents results while Section V
concludes.
II. Empirical Specification
Gould (1994) borrows from Bergstrand (1985),
developing a gravity specification where endogen-
ously determined transaction costs decline as immi-
grants provide the host country with information
regarding home country markets. Gould allows for
decreasing marginal effects of immigration on trade;
however, I follow Girma and Yu (2002) and Head
and Ries (1998) by assuming that if effects
are decreasing, they diminish over a lengthy horizon
– perhaps generations – as immigrant stocks increase
and average lengths of stay rise.
Following Gould (1994), Head and Ries (1998),
and Girma and Yu (2002), I use a gravity equation
where country i (US) imports from country j are
defined as follows.8
IMPORTSij ¼ sijyj ð1Þ
The share of country j output consumed by country i
is given by sij and yj represents country jGDP. A fully
integrated world economy with symmetric differen-
tiated products implies balanced trade between i and
j. Helpman (1984) shows that under such conditions
sij¼ yi/yw, where yw is global GDP. Tariffs, transport
costs and nontariff barriers are distortionary so
that sij 6¼ yi/yw. ij is included to account for such
barriers.
sij ¼ ðyi=ywÞ
ij
ð2Þ
I assume ij ¼ expij , where ij is a vector of trade-
inhibiting factors. Substituting for ij in Equation 2,
3Absolute Factor Price Equalization (FPE) implies returns equate across nations over the long run; however, relative FPE
only dictates the long-run equalization of factor price ratios across nations.
4McCallum (1995) reports home bias using 1988 USA-Canada trade data. Intra-provincial trade was found to be 20 times
greater than province-state trade. Ceglowski (2002), Wei (1998), Helliwell (1996, 1997) and Engel and Rogers (1996) have also
documented positive home bias/border effects.
5 Rauch and Watson (2002), Rauch and Trindade (2002) and Rauch (1999, 2001) investigate networks finding networks
reduce lax contract enforcement and information asymmetries regarding opportunities. Networks may also deter
opportunistic behaviour.
6 The Naturalization Act of 1790 stipulated only free white immigrants may become US citizens. The Chinese Exclusion Act
of 1882 banned Chinese immigration, was broadened in 1917 to exclude most Asian immigrants, and created the Asiatic
Barred Zone which excluded immigrants from India, Indochina, the East Indies, Polynesia, parts of Russia, Arabia and
Afghanistan. The National Origins Act of 1921 established immigrant quotas with the total annual limit equal to 3% of the
1910 US foreign-born population; that is, persons of European descent. Not repealed until 1952, the Immigration Act of 1924
banned Japanese immigration and revised the annual quota down to 2%. From 1924 to 1964, over 94% of visas went
to immigrants from Europe, Canada or Oceania (Martin and Midgely, 1999).
7 The World Bank classified nations as low income if 1995 GNP per capita was <$765; middle-income if per capita GNP was
between $765 and $9385; high income if GNP per capita was >$9 385.
8Anderson (1979), Bergstrand (1985), Helpman and Krugman (1985), Davis (1995), Deardorff (1998), Feenstra et al. (1999),
Haveman and Hummels (2001) and Eaton and Kortum (2001) each present theoretical foundations of the gravity equation as
a legitimate model of international trade.
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and then Equation 2 into 1 and taking natural
logarithms yields
ln IMPORTSij ¼ ln yiyj
yw
 
þij ð3Þ
Thus, trade is a function of the total incomes of
countries i and j and variables that inhibit
trade between the nations. Specifically, the vector
ij is constructed as
ij ¼ ln DISTANCEij, MILITARYij,

SANCTIONSij

ð4Þ
A vector of trade-facilitating variables, ij, is added
to Equation 3. ij is constructed as
ij¼
n
ln IMMIGRANTSij, ln GDP per capitaj,
 ln EXCHANGERATEijt, ln FDIOUTij,
ln FDIINij, FTAij, LANGUAGEij, OPECj
o
ð5Þ
IMMIGRANTSijt represent the immigrant stock
from country j. A vector of time dummies, t,
absorbs macroeconomic fluctuations and policy
decisions affecting trade. As US GDP is invariant
across trading partners within a year, any related
trade effects are subsumed into the year dummies.
Using Equations 4 and 5, t, and defining the
dependent variable as a vector of trade measures,
Equation 3 is rewritten as
ln TRADEijt ¼ ln yjt þijt þ ijt þt ð6Þ
TRADEijt includes c.i.f. (cost including freight)
imports from and f.o.b. (free on board) exports to
country j as well as the sum of imports from and
exports to country j.9
III. Data and Variable Construction
Macro data for the years 1980 to 2001 is employed.10
Decennial US censuses provide country-level immi-
grant stocks at three points in time. I use these values
as benchmarks, and incorporate inflow data to
estimate immigrant stocks during the intra-census
years. For example, immigrant stocks for the years
1981 to 1989 are constructed as
IMMIGRANTSijt ¼ IMMIGRANTSij1980
þ
Xt
1981
INFLOWijt þ j ð7Þ
j is an adjustment factor accounting for return
migration, death of immigrants during intra-census
years, and amnesties. It is the immigrant stock from
country j in the USA given by the 1990 decennial
census less the sum of immigrants from country j in
the USA in 1980 and the inflow from country j during
the years 1981 to 1990 divided by 10:
j¼ 1
10
IMMIGRANTSij1990 IMMIGRANTSij1980
""
þ
X1990
t¼1981
INFLOWijt
#
ð8Þ
For the years 1991 to 1999, the immigrant stock
variable is constructed similarly. The adjustment
made to the 2001 portion of the sample is based on
the adjustment factor derived when estimating 1991
to 1999 immigrant stocks.
IMMIGRANTSij2001
¼ IMMIGRANTSij2000 þ INFLOWij2001
 
 1þ j
IMMIGRANTSij2000
 
ð9Þ
The final term in Equation 9, the adjustment
percentage, is based on the difference between raw
2000 immigrant values and 2000 benchmark values.
Combination of the 1981 to 1989 and 1991 to 1999
estimated immigrant stock values and the 2001
estimated immigrant stock along with use of the
benchmark values from 1980, 1990 and 2000 results
in a set of immigrant values for each country over
the years 1980 to 2001.
FDI stock measures economic integration.
Graham and Krugman (1995) report the bulk of
US FDI inflows through the mid-1990s were
equity acquisitions. Lipsey (1993) reports that,
by the end of the 1980s, foreign affiliates accounted
for 23% of US exports and more than one-third of
imports. I construct two FDI variables. The first,
FDI_OUT, is the US FDI stock in country j
while the second, FDI_IN, is the country j FDI
stock in the US Both are measured relative to country
j’s GDP.
Prior research employed alternative measures to
represent globalization of production. Gould (1994)
includes the sum of bilateral FDI when testing for
robustness. Head and Ries (1998) use the trading
partner’s volume of trade divided by GDP to
control for the nation’s propensity for external
trade. I alter Gould’s measure to compensate for
9 The three variables in the TRADEijt vector are derived using data from Feenstra et al. (2002). Each series has been converted
from nominal to real values using the US GDP deflator.
10Appendix A lists each variable employed, its description and source.
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the size of country j’s economy and decompose
the variable into two separate stocks as US FDI
inflows may affect trade differently than US FDI
outflows.11
Country j real GDP measures the economic
mass. Higher GDP values signal larger potential
export markets for domestic goods and greater
output that the USA may import. Real GDP per
capita proxies for individual wealth in country j.
Representing terms of trade changes, the annual
change in the US-country j exchange rate is
included.12 Capturing trade-generating effects of
trade agreements, FTA equals 1 if country j is
party to a trade agreement with the USA for 6
months during year t. LANGUAGE is equal to 1 if
English is an official language of country j.
Common language is often cited as a proxy for
cultural similarity (Brainard, 1993, 1997; Engel and
Rogers, 1996; Helliwell, 1997; Hutchison, 2002).
OPEC controls for US petroleum imports and
equals 1 if country j was an OPEC member for 6
months in year t.
DISTANCE serves to proxy for transport costs.
Time-varying import-, export- and trade volume-
weighted distances between the 22 busiest US
ports (in terms of annual trade volume) and each
trading partner’s capital city are derived via the
‘Great Circle’ method. The distance between
each capital city-US port pair was weighted by the
port’s annual share of total trade. The summation of
these weighted distances produces the utilized mea-
sures. As US military involvement in country j
may indicate uncertainty exists regarding current
and future business opportunities, MILITARY is
included as a dummy variable.13 SANCTIONS is
a dummy variable indicating that US-imposed
economic sanctions on country j were in place
during year t.14
The vector TRADE is regressed on immigrant
stock values and other control variables. Addition of
an independently and identically distributed error
term to Equation 6 yields
ln TRADEijt ¼ 0 þ 1ðln IMMIGRANTSijtÞ
þ 2ðln GDPjtÞ þ 3ðln GDP per capitajtÞ
þ 4ð ln EXCHANGE RATEijtÞ
þ 5ðln DISTANCEijÞ þ 6ðFTAijtÞ
þ 7ðFDI OUTijtÞ þ 8ðFDI INijtÞ
þ 9ðLANGUAGEijÞ
þ 10ðMILITARYijtÞ þ 11ðOPECitÞ
þ 12ðSANCTIONSijtÞ þ t þ "ijt ð10Þ
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics. The immigrant
stock of high income nations is typically higher than
that of medium or low income nations.15 High
income countries trade more with the USA than do
middle or low income countries. US FDI tends to be
highest in medium income nations, while country j
FDI in the USA is highest for high income nations.
US military involvement and economic sanctions are
more common occurrences for low income countries.
Table 2 lists the countries in the data set.
IV. Econometric Results
Equation 10 is estimated by pooled Ordinary Least
Squares. Table 3 presents results.16 For the full
sample, a 10% immigrant stock increase, all else held
constant, increases US-country j trade volume by
1.66% and imports from and exports to country j by
1.3 and 1.13%, respectively. The results are similar to
prior research. Head and Ries (1998), using Canadian
data for 1980 to 1992, report coefficients of 0.10 and
0.31, respectively, when estimating immigrant effects
on Canadian exports and imports. Girma and
Yu (2002) employ data for 1981 to 1993, classify
11 The BEA data does not include specific values, for reasons of protecting firm confidentiality, if FDI is <$500 000. I have
coded these withheld values as the upper limit of $500 000. This overstates the degree of economic integration between the
USA and country j. In alternative regressions I set the withheld FDI values equal to $0. The coefficients on the FDI variables
decrease in size and, in some cases, the level of significance; however, the coefficients on the IMMIGRANTS variables are
largely unaffected.
12 Expressed as foreign currency units per US dollar, an increase in the value represents a depreciation of country j’s currency
indicating an expected increase (decrease) in US imports from (exports to) country j.
13Appendix B lists US military interventions involving countries represented in this study.
14Appendix C lists US-imposed economic sanctions involving countries represented in this study. Hufbauer et al. (1997)
report sanctions decrease trade flows by a quarter to one-third.
15 Excluding Mexico from the medium income classification lowers the mean immigrant stock to 159 752.
16 Time dummies were included in each regression. Due to space constraints, coefficients are not reported.
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Table 1. Descriptive statistics – full sample and segmented samples (based on income level)
Full sample
High-income
countries
Medium-income
countries
Low-income
countries
Variable N¼ 1,599 N¼ 506 N¼ 726 N¼ 367
Immigrants 241,008 207,761 303,354 164,967
(638,867) (256,535) (905,624) (241,157)
Export-weighted distance (km) 8,724.36 8,563.70 8,760.36 8,871.86
(3,503.13) (3,494.46) (3,536.06) (3,451.07)
Import-weighted distance (km) 8,695.31 8,532.83 8,723.21 8,860.96
(3,518.59) (3,515.03) (3,550.89) (3,460.05)
Volume of trade-weighted distance (km) 8,707.86 8,546.44 8,739.03 8,865.74
(3,511.39) (3,505.52) (3,544.05) (3,455.67)
Gross domestic product (in $1,000s) 245,397,999 620,138,713 80,698,320 58,106,997
(634,009,053) (1,016,529,780) (120,807,148) (154,237,208)
Per capita gross domestic product 8,342 22,106 2,838 405
(10,831) (9,301) (2,086) (201)
 exchange rate 0.1635 0.0367 0.2312 0.2045
(0.4567) (0.1568) (0.5041) (0.5835)
Exports (in $1,000s) 5,564,381 12,667,941 2,996,518 938,358
(14,695,472) (21,504,119) (9,965,725) (2,718,910)
Imports (in $1,000s) 7,383,510 16,054,013 3,664,623 2,871,850
(20,960,565) (31,857,769) (11,057,769) (11,376,300)
Volume of trade (in $1,000s) 12,947,891 28,721,954 6,661,140 3,810,200
(35,189,992) (52,895,124) (20,866,176) (13,999,600)
US direct investment in country j 0.0483 0.0426 0.0681 0.0177
(relative to GDPj) (0.1771) (0.0567) (0.2566) (0.0289)
Country j direct investment in U.S. 0.0166 0.0292 0.0161 0.0003
(relative to GDPj) (0.0686) (0.0491) (0.0921) (0.0005)
Free trade agreement 0.0230 0.0573 0.0110 0.0
(0.1501) (0.2327) (0.1045) (0.0)
Common language (English) 0.2055 0.2174 0.1212 0.3529
(0.4042) (0.4129) (0.3266) (0.4785)
US military action involving country j 0.0249 0.0 0.0275 0.0535
(0.1559) (0.0) (0.1638) (0.2253)
OECD membership 0.3126 0.8360 0.1088 0.0
(0.4637) (0.3707) (0.3116) (0.0)
US-imposed economic sanctions 0.1357 0.0079 0.1584 0.2647
(0.3426) (0.0886) (0.3654) (0.4418)
Standard deviations in parentheses.
Table 2. Countries represented
High-income countries Medium-income countries Low-income countries
Australia Japan Argentina Jordan Bangladesh Pakistan
Austria Korea, Republic of Bolivia Malaysia China Senegal
Belgium Netherlands Brazil Mexico Ethiopia Sierra Leone
Canada New Zealand Chile Morocco Ghana Sri Lanka
Cyprus Norway Colombia Panama Guyana Tanzania
Denmark Portugal Costa Rica Peru Haiti Vietnam
Finland Singapore Dominican Rep. Philippines Honduras
France Spain Ecuador Poland India
Germany Sweden Egypt Romania Kenya
Ireland Switzerland El Salvador South Africa Nicaragua
Israel United Kingdom Fiji Syria Nigeria
Italy Greece Thailand
Guatemala Trinidad and Tobago
Hungary Turkey
Indonesia Uruguay
Iran Venezuela
Jamaica
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UK trading partners by commonwealth membership,
and report immigrant stock coefficients of 0.16 and
0.1 when examining UK exports and imports to
noncommonwealth countries. It is posited that
commonwealth–UK social/political institution simi-
larities negate potential immigrant-trade effects.
Using data for 1970 to 1986, Gould (1994) presents
coefficients of 0.02 and 0.01 when considering the
immigrant effects on US exports and imports,
respectively. The lower coefficients are attributable
to difference in specification.
The FDI_OUT coefficients, as expected, are
positive and significant. However, while the
FDI_IN coefficients are positive, they are of lesser
magnitude and significant in only one of the three
regressions. The GDP coefficient indicates that the
US trades more with larger economies. The 
EXCHANGE RATE coefficients signal depreciation
of country j’s currency relative to the dollar reduces
exports to country j and US-country j trade volume.
The coefficients on the DISTANCE variables, which
proxy for transport costs, are negative and signifi-
cant. The US is found to trade more with countries
they are party to trade agreements with and those
for who English is an official language. The two
remaining trade-inhibiting variables that proxy for
uncertainty as signalled by US military involvement
in country j and that indicate US imposition of
economic sanctions on country j are, as expected,
negative and generally significant.
Investigating variation in immigrant-trade links,
I stratify the sample by per capita GDP. Only
immigrants from low income countries significantly
increase US-home country trade. Based on the
coefficients for the low income country sample, a
10% increase in the immigrant stock increases the
volume of trade by 2.13%, imports from country j
by 4.66% and exports to country j by 1.47%. The
coefficients on the immigrant stock variables for the
high and medium income samples do not indicate
trade-increasing effects. This finding is counter to
that of Co et al. (2004) who, examining 1993 US state
exports to 28 nations, report near-identical immigrant
stock coefficients for both ‘developed’ and ‘devel-
oping’ home country samples. As the current sample
spans 22 years and includes 73 nations that are
classified into three income classifications, the results
presented here are arguably more reliable than the
referenced prior findings.
Observed links may result from unobservable home
country characteristics. If so, then pooled OLS may
be an incorrect estimation technique. Similarly,
results reported for low and medium income
countries may be driven by China and Mexico
(home countries of large immigrant populations
with whom the US has expanded trade considerably
in recent decades) and Vietnam (from which many
have emigrated, but with which the USA trades little).
Examining robustness, I estimate fixed effect equa-
tions (to address possible specification error) and use
pooled OLS to estimate Equation 10 with China,
Mexico and Vietnam excluded (to address sample
selection bias). Following Head and Ries (1998),
Equation 10 is estimated using pooled OLS with
lagged dependent variables as explanatory variables.
Table 4 summarizes the results.17
The results of the robustness checks support the
findings reported in Table 3. Observed links appear
driven by immigration from relatively low income
nations. The top panel shows that, for low income
nations, coefficients on the immigrant stock variables
generally increase in magnitude and significance once
allowing for fixed effects. Exclusion of China, Mexico
and Vietnam generates similar results. That said,
inclusion of lagged dependent variables as explana-
tory variables reduces significance and coefficients on
the immigrant stock variables lower.
To determine the effects of the conjectured
channels via which the immigrant-trade link operates
requires an assumption regarding interpretation of
coefficients. Rauch (2001) states that, ‘a reasonable
interpretation of the larger import elasticity is that it
combines a taste effect and a network effect, while
the export elasticity only reflects a network effect’.
In Table 3, where coefficients are significant, this is
true. Table 5 presents the effects of a hypothetical
10% increase in the country j immigrant stock. These
values are based on the reported coefficients for the
low income sample of countries and on annual
trade flow and immigrant stock data for the years
1980 to 2001. For high and medium income
countries, effects are set equal to zero as the
coefficients were not both significant and positive.
For low income countries, on average, a 10%
increase in immigrant stock increases US-country j
trade by $87.6 million.
The immigrant stock coefficient with US
exports used as the dependent variable represents
pure increases in exports due to networks. Estimated
network effects are presented in column (a).
Assuming a symmetric network effect with respect
to imports and exports, column (b) presents lower
bound estimates of increases in US imports.
The residual effects column (g) of immigration on
US imports can be considered the upper bound
transplanted home bias effect. However, assuming
17 The complete set of estimation results is available upon request from the author.
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symmetry with respect to network effects on US
imports may be flawed. Immigrants may arrive with
home market information previously unknown to US
residents that potentially increases US-home country
trade, but a time lag may exist during which an
immigrant searches for reliable domestic suppliers.
If so, network effects would increase US imports
proportionally more than US exports. Symmetric
effects would then understate the network effect
and overstate the transplanted home bias effect on
US imports.
Accepting the estimated effects of an immigrant
stock increase presented in column (a) as the network
effect of immigration on US exports, the decomposi-
tion of the increase in US imports requires
deriving lower and upper bound values for each
channel. At one extreme, the full increase is due to a
network effect. This provides an upper bound
estimate of the effect on US imports and a
corresponding lower bound estimate of transplanted
home bias. These estimates are reported in columns
(c) and (f), respectively. At the other extreme,
applying symmetric effects on US imports from and
exports to country j represents an upper bound
estimate of the transplanted home bias effect and
a lower bound estimate of the network effect on
US imports.
A 10% increase in the immigrant stock increases
annual US exports to the typical home country by
$13.7 million. The average annual network effect on
US imports ranges from $13.7 million to $73.9
million. Columns (b) and (c) of Table 5 present
these results. Average transplanted home bias effects
on US imports are derived as the residual once
network effects are accounted for. Estimated lower
and upper bound annual increases in US imports
equal $0 and $60.1 million, respectively. Estimates are
presented in columns (f) and (g), respectively. The
Table 4. Summary of immigrant stock coefficients, robustness checks
Robustness check: fixed effects estimation
Sample/Dep. variable ln Volume of tradeijt ln Importsijt ln Exportsijt
Full sample 0.0583 0.0073 0.0346
(0.0423) (0.0829) (0.0661)
High-income countries 0.1078** 0.0995** 0.0786*
(0.0314) (0.0376) (0.039)
Medium-income countries 0.218** 0.0318 0.3551*
(0.0787) (0.1396) (0.1542)
Low-income countries 0.691** 0.8077** 0.0368
(0.1247) (0.2925) (0.1205)
Robustness check: China, Mexico, and Vietnam excluded from data sample
Sample/Dep. variable ln Volume of tradeijt ln Importsijt ln Exportsijt
Full sample 0.1926** 0.2384** 0.1346**
(0.0219) (0.0369) (0.0237)
High-income countries 0.0327 0.1171** 0.0478
(0.032) (0.0391) (0.0302)
Medium-income countries 0.0527 0.1197 0.1183*
(0.0434) (0.0791) (0.0511)
Low-income countries 0.5403** 0.873** 0.3592**
(0.0407) (0.0872) (0.0253)
Robustness check: lagged dependent variable included as additonal explantory variable
Sample/Dep. variable ln Volume of tradeijt ln Importsijt ln Exportsijt
Full sample 0.0364* 0.055* 0.065**
(0.0152) (0.023) (0.0188)
High-income countries 0.0115* 0.0195 0.001
(0.0048) (0.0602) (0.0069)
Medium-income countries 0.0327 0.0298 0.0515#
(0.0264) (0.0298) (0.0298)
Low-income countries 0.0616# 0.103# 0.0705*
(0.0335) (0.059) (0.0356)
Heteroskedasticity-consistent robust standard errors in parentheses. Statistical significance is indicated as follows. ‘**’, ‘*’,
and ‘#’ represent significance from zero at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively.
846 R. White
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
By
: [
W
hi
te
, R
og
er
] A
t: 
11
:3
7 
2 
M
ay
 2
00
7 
T
a
b
le
5
.
A
g
g
re
g
a
te
ef
fe
ct
s
o
f
a
1
0
p
er
ce
n
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
IM
M
IG
R
A
N
T
S
ij
t
o
n
U
S
-h
o
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
b
il
a
te
ra
l
tr
a
d
e
fl
o
w
s
B
u
si
n
es
s-
n
et
w
o
rk
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s
(B
N
O
)
ef
fe
ct
o
n
T
ra
n
sp
la
n
te
d
h
o
m
e
b
ia
s
(T
H
B
)
ef
fe
ct
o
n
T
o
ta
l
ef
fe
ct
(B
N
O
þ
T
H
B
)
o
n
E
x
p
o
rt
s
Im
p
o
rt
s
(l
o
w
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
(u
p
p
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
(l
o
w
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
(u
p
p
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
(l
o
w
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
(u
p
p
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
(l
o
w
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
(u
p
p
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
C
o
u
n
tr
y
(a
)
(b
)
(c
)
(d
)
(e
)
(f
)
(g
)
(h
)
(i
)
(j
)
B
a
n
g
la
d
es
h
3
,4
4
9
,9
8
9
3
,4
4
9
,9
8
9
4
2
,3
9
3
,6
3
2
6
,8
9
9
,9
7
8
4
5
,8
4
3
,6
2
1
0
3
8
,9
4
3
,6
4
3
0
3
8
,9
4
3
,6
4
3
4
5
,8
4
3
,6
2
1
C
h
in
a
1
3
4
,6
4
2
,0
6
8
1
3
4
,6
4
2
,0
6
8
5
4
6
,6
7
0
,3
2
7
2
6
9
,2
8
4
,1
3
5
6
8
1
,3
1
2
,3
9
5
0
4
1
2
,0
2
8
,2
5
9
0
4
1
2
,0
2
8
,2
5
9
6
8
1
,3
1
2
,3
9
5
E
th
io
p
ia
1
,9
0
2
,0
1
0
1
,9
0
2
,0
1
0
2
,5
7
9
,1
8
3
3
,8
0
4
,0
2
1
4
,4
8
1
,1
9
4
0
6
7
7
,1
7
3
0
6
7
7
,1
7
3
4
,4
8
1
,1
9
4
G
h
a
n
a
2
,1
9
0
,3
0
2
2
,1
9
0
,3
0
2
8
,6
4
7
,7
6
3
4
,3
8
0
,6
0
4
1
0
,8
3
8
,0
6
5
0
6
,4
5
7
,4
6
1
0
6
,4
5
7
,4
6
1
1
0
,8
3
8
,0
6
5
G
u
y
a
n
a
1
,2
8
6
,3
7
4
1
,2
8
6
,3
7
4
4
,7
8
9
,6
3
5
2
,5
7
2
,7
4
8
6
,0
7
6
,0
0
9
0
3
,5
0
3
,2
6
1
0
3
,5
0
3
,2
6
1
6
,0
7
6
,0
0
9
H
a
it
i
5
,8
3
7
,6
2
6
5
,8
3
7
,6
2
6
1
3
,1
5
8
,6
4
3
1
1
,6
7
5
,2
5
1
1
8
,9
9
6
,2
6
8
0
7
,3
2
1
,0
1
7
0
7
,3
2
1
,0
1
7
1
8
,9
9
6
,2
6
8
H
o
n
d
u
ra
s
1
3
,6
0
7
,4
2
7
1
3
,6
0
7
,4
2
7
5
6
,3
6
0
,0
0
3
2
7
,2
1
4
,8
5
4
6
9
,9
6
7
,4
3
0
0
4
2
,7
5
2
,5
7
6
0
4
2
,7
5
2
,5
7
6
6
9
,9
6
7
,4
3
0
In
d
ia
3
7
,0
7
4
,0
3
2
3
7
,0
7
4
,0
3
2
2
2
1
,1
7
9
,4
5
4
7
4
,1
4
8
,0
6
4
2
5
8
,2
5
3
,4
8
6
0
1
8
4
,1
0
5
,4
2
2
0
1
8
4
,1
0
5
,4
2
2
2
5
8
,2
5
3
,4
8
6
K
en
y
a
1
,9
9
3
,8
8
3
1
,9
9
3
,8
8
3
4
,2
1
7
,6
3
5
3
,9
8
7
,7
6
5
6
,2
1
1
,5
1
8
0
2
,2
2
3
,7
5
2
0
2
,2
2
3
,7
5
2
6
,2
1
1
,5
1
8
N
ic
a
ra
g
u
a
2
,4
4
9
,8
7
5
2
,4
4
9
,8
7
5
9
,4
2
0
,0
3
8
4
,8
9
9
,7
4
9
1
1
,8
6
9
,9
1
2
0
6
,9
7
0
,1
6
3
0
6
,9
7
0
,1
6
3
1
1
,8
6
9
,9
1
2
N
ig
er
ia
1
1
,2
6
5
,6
2
0
1
1
,2
6
5
,6
2
0
2
7
0
,1
9
1
,0
9
8
2
2
,5
3
1
,2
4
1
2
8
1
,4
5
6
,7
1
8
0
2
5
8
,9
2
5
,4
7
8
0
2
5
8
,9
2
5
,4
7
8
2
8
1
,4
5
6
,7
1
8
P
a
k
is
ta
n
1
2
,3
0
5
,1
2
0
1
2
,3
0
5
,1
2
0
3
1
,9
5
2
,9
9
6
2
4
,6
1
0
,2
4
1
4
4
,2
5
8
,1
1
6
0
1
9
,6
4
7
,8
7
5
0
1
9
,6
4
7
,8
7
5
4
4
,2
5
8
,1
1
6
S
en
eg
a
l
8
2
7
,6
2
2
8
2
7
,6
2
2
9
6
3
,6
0
2
1
,6
5
5
,2
4
5
1
,7
9
1
,2
2
4
0
1
3
5
,9
8
0
0
1
3
5
,9
8
0
1
,7
9
1
,2
2
4
S
ie
rr
a
L
eo
n
e
2
7
1
,4
8
4
2
7
1
,4
8
4
1
,5
8
3
,2
0
6
5
4
2
,9
6
8
1
,8
5
4
,6
9
0
0
1
,3
1
1
,7
2
2
0
1
,3
1
1
,7
2
2
1
,8
5
4
,6
9
0
S
ri
L
a
n
k
a
2
,0
7
5
,3
0
4
2
,0
7
5
,3
0
4
3
1
,9
3
1
,4
3
7
4
,1
5
0
,6
0
9
3
4
,0
0
6
,7
4
1
0
2
9
,8
5
6
,1
3
2
0
2
9
,8
5
6
,1
3
2
3
4
,0
0
6
,7
4
1
T
a
n
za
n
ia
6
5
2
,6
0
8
6
5
2
,6
0
8
1
,0
6
0
,2
9
1
1
,3
0
5
,2
1
5
1
,7
1
2
,8
9
8
0
4
0
7
,6
8
3
0
4
0
7
,6
8
3
1
,7
1
2
,8
9
8
V
ie
tn
a
m
1
,8
6
6
,6
0
8
1
,8
6
6
,6
0
8
8
,8
6
5
,8
5
1
3
,7
3
3
,2
1
7
1
0
,7
3
2
,4
6
0
0
6
,9
9
9
,2
4
3
0
6
,9
9
9
,2
4
3
1
0
,7
3
2
,4
6
0
A
v
er
a
g
e
1
3
,7
4
6
,9
3
8
1
3
,7
4
6
,9
3
8
7
3
,8
8
0
,2
8
2
2
7
,4
9
3
,8
7
7
8
7
,6
2
7
,2
2
0
0
6
0
,1
3
3
,3
4
4
0
6
0
,1
3
3
,3
4
4
8
7
,6
2
7
,2
2
0
C
o
lu
m
n
(a
)
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
v
a
lu
e
o
f
co
u
n
tr
y
j’
s
a
n
n
u
a
l
ex
p
o
rt
s
to
th
e
U
.S
.
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
b
y
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
o
n
th
e
IM
M
IG
R
A
N
T
S
v
a
ri
a
b
le
(a
ss
u
m
in
g
a
te
n
p
er
ce
n
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
le
v
el
o
f
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
j
im
m
ig
ra
n
t
st
o
ck
)
w
h
en
th
e
E
X
P
O
R
T
S
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
em
p
lo
y
ed
a
s
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(b
)
is
eq
u
a
l
to
th
e
v
a
lu
e
p
re
se
n
te
d
in
co
lu
m
n
(a
)
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
th
e
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
th
a
t
a
n
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
IM
M
IG
R
A
N
T
S
v
a
ri
a
b
le
a
ff
ec
ts
U
.S
.
ex
p
o
rt
s
to
co
u
n
tr
y
j
a
n
d
U
.S
.
im
p
o
rt
s
fr
o
m
co
u
n
tr
y
j
to
a
n
id
en
ti
ca
l
ex
te
n
t.
C
o
lu
m
n
(c
)
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
th
e
a
v
er
a
g
e
v
a
lu
e
o
f
co
u
n
tr
y
j’
s
a
n
n
u
a
l
im
p
o
rt
s
fr
o
m
th
e
U
.S
.
m
u
lt
ip
li
ed
ti
m
es
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
o
n
th
e
IM
M
IG
R
A
N
T
S
v
a
ri
a
b
le
(a
ss
u
m
in
g
a
te
n
p
er
ce
n
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
le
v
el
o
f
th
e
co
u
n
tr
y
j
im
m
ig
ra
n
t
st
o
ck
)
w
h
en
th
e
IM
P
O
R
T
S
v
a
ri
a
b
le
is
em
p
lo
y
ed
a
s
th
e
d
ep
en
d
en
t
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
C
o
lu
m
n
(d
)
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
th
e
su
m
o
f
co
lu
m
n
s
(a
)
a
n
d
(b
).
C
o
lu
m
n
(e
)
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
th
e
su
m
o
f
co
lu
m
n
s
(a
)
a
n
d
(c
).
V
a
lu
es
in
C
o
lu
m
n
(f
)
a
n
d
in
C
o
lu
m
n
(h
)
a
re
se
t
eq
u
a
l
to
ze
ro
to
re
fl
ec
t
th
a
t,
in
a
n
ex
tr
em
e
sc
en
a
ri
o
,
a
ll
o
f
th
e
o
b
se
rv
ed
in
cr
ea
se
in
U
.S
.
im
p
o
rt
s
fr
o
m
co
u
n
tr
y
j
a
re
th
e
re
su
lt
o
f
th
e
ex
p
lo
it
a
ti
o
n
o
f
b
u
si
n
es
s-
n
et
w
o
rk
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s
a
n
d
a
re
n
o
t
d
u
e
to
tr
a
n
sp
la
n
te
d
h
o
m
e
b
ia
s.
C
o
lu
m
n
(g
)
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
th
e
d
if
fe
re
n
ce
b
et
w
ee
n
th
e
es
ti
m
a
te
d
co
ef
fi
ci
en
t
o
n
th
e
IM
M
IG
R
A
N
T
S
v
a
ri
a
b
le
a
n
d
th
e
p
er
ce
n
ta
g
e
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
le
v
el
o
f
U
.S
.
im
p
o
rt
s
fr
o
m
co
u
n
tr
y
j
a
tt
ri
b
u
te
d
to
th
e
ex
p
lo
it
a
ti
o
n
o
f
b
u
si
n
es
s-
n
et
w
o
rk
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s
(g
iv
en
a
te
n
p
er
ce
n
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
IM
M
IG
R
A
N
T
S
)
a
n
d
fo
ll
o
w
in
g
th
e
a
ss
u
m
p
ti
o
n
th
a
t
U
.S
.
im
p
o
rt
s
fr
o
m
co
u
n
tr
y
j
a
n
d
U
.S
.
ex
p
o
rt
s
to
co
u
n
tr
y
j
a
re
a
ff
ec
te
d
to
a
n
eq
u
a
l
ex
te
n
t.
C
o
lu
m
n
(i
)
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
b
ei
n
g
eq
u
a
l
to
co
lu
m
n
(g
).
C
o
lu
m
n
(j
)
is
ca
lc
u
la
te
d
a
s
b
ei
n
g
eq
u
a
l
to
co
lu
m
n
(g
)
p
lu
s
co
lu
m
n
(d
),
o
r
si
m
p
ly
a
s
co
lu
m
n
(e
).
A
v
er
a
g
e
v
a
lu
es
a
re
a
ri
th
m
et
ic
m
ea
n
s
a
n
d
a
re
n
o
t
w
ei
g
h
te
d
v
a
lu
es
.
Immigrant-trade links 847
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
By
: [
W
hi
te
, R
og
er
] A
t: 
11
:3
7 
2 
M
ay
 2
00
7 
T
a
b
le
6
.
P
er
im
m
ig
ra
n
t
ef
fe
ct
s
o
f
a
1
0
p
er
ce
n
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
IM
M
IG
R
A
N
T
S
ij
t
o
n
U
S
-h
o
m
e
co
u
n
tr
y
b
il
a
te
ra
l
tr
a
d
e
fl
o
w
s
B
u
si
n
es
s-
n
et
w
o
rk
o
p
p
o
rt
u
n
it
ie
s
(B
N
O
)
ef
fe
ct
o
n
T
ra
n
sp
la
n
te
d
h
o
m
e
b
ia
s
(T
H
B
)
ef
fe
ct
o
n
T
o
ta
l
ef
fe
ct
(B
N
O
þ
T
H
B
)
o
n
E
x
p
o
rt
s
Im
p
o
rt
s
(l
o
w
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
(u
p
p
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
(l
o
w
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
(u
p
p
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
(l
o
w
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
Im
p
o
rt
s
(u
p
p
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
(l
o
w
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
(u
p
p
er
b
o
u
n
d
)
V
o
lu
m
e
o
f
tr
a
d
e
C
o
u
n
tr
y
(a
)
(b
)
(c
)
(d
)
(e
)
(f
)
(g
)
(h
)
(i
)
(j
)
B
a
n
g
la
d
es
h
8
0
7
8
0
7
9
,9
1
7
1
,6
1
4
1
0
,7
2
4
0
9
,1
1
0
0
9
,1
1
0
1
0
,7
2
4
C
h
in
a
2
,2
6
1
2
,2
6
1
9
,1
8
0
4
,5
2
2
1
1
,4
4
2
0
6
,9
1
9
0
6
,9
1
9
1
1
,4
4
2
E
th
io
p
ia
4
4
6
4
4
6
6
0
5
8
9
3
1
,0
5
2
0
1
5
9
0
1
5
9
1
,0
5
2
G
h
a
n
a
7
6
3
7
6
3
3
,0
1
2
1
,5
2
6
3
,7
7
5
0
2
,2
4
9
0
2
,2
4
9
3
,7
7
5
G
u
y
a
n
a
1
0
0
1
0
0
3
7
3
2
0
0
4
7
3
0
2
7
3
0
2
7
3
4
7
3
H
a
it
i
2
2
9
2
2
9
5
1
7
4
5
9
7
4
7
0
2
8
8
0
2
8
8
7
4
7
H
o
n
d
u
ra
s
1
,0
5
8
1
,0
5
8
4
,3
8
1
2
,1
1
5
5
,4
3
8
0
3
,3
2
3
0
3
,3
2
3
5
,4
3
8
In
d
ia
6
9
3
6
9
3
4
,1
3
2
1
,3
8
5
4
,8
2
5
0
3
,4
4
0
0
3
,4
4
0
4
,8
2
5
K
en
y
a
1
,1
8
0
1
,1
8
0
2
,4
9
6
2
,3
6
0
3
,6
7
5
0
1
,3
1
6
0
1
,3
1
6
3
,6
7
5
N
ic
a
ra
g
u
a
1
4
8
1
4
8
5
7
0
2
9
6
7
1
8
0
4
2
2
0
4
2
2
7
1
8
N
ig
er
ia
1
,8
4
0
1
,8
4
0
4
,4
1
2
3
,6
7
9
6
,2
5
2
0
2
,5
7
2
0
2
,5
7
2
6
,2
5
2
P
a
k
is
ta
n
1
,0
7
2
1
,0
7
2
2
,7
8
4
2
,1
4
4
3
,8
5
6
0
1
,7
1
2
0
1
,7
1
2
3
,8
5
6
S
en
eg
a
l
2
,3
2
5
2
,3
2
5
2
,7
0
7
4
,6
5
0
5
,0
3
2
0
3
8
2
0
3
8
2
5
,0
3
2
S
ie
rr
a
L
eo
n
e
2
9
2
2
9
2
1
,7
0
2
5
8
4
1
,9
9
4
0
1
,4
1
0
0
1
,4
1
0
1
,9
9
4
S
ri
L
a
n
k
a
1
,3
0
9
1
,3
0
9
2
,0
1
5
2
,6
1
9
3
,3
2
4
0
7
0
6
0
7
0
6
3
,3
2
4
T
a
n
za
n
ia
9
2
6
9
2
6
1
,5
0
4
1
,8
5
1
2
,4
3
0
0
5
7
8
0
5
7
8
2
,4
3
0
V
ie
tn
a
m
2
9
2
9
1
3
6
5
7
1
6
4
0
1
0
7
0
1
0
7
1
6
4
A
v
er
a
g
e
9
1
0
9
1
0
2
,9
6
7
1
,8
2
1
3
,8
7
8
0
2
,0
5
7
0
2
,0
5
7
3
,8
7
8
V
a
lu
es
p
re
se
n
te
d
h
a
v
e
b
ee
n
co
n
st
ru
ct
ed
a
s
th
e
v
a
lu
es
p
re
se
n
te
d
in
T
a
b
le
5
d
iv
id
ed
b
y
th
e
n
u
m
er
ic
eq
u
iv
a
le
n
t
to
a
te
n
p
er
ce
n
t
in
cr
ea
se
in
th
e
IM
M
IG
R
A
N
T
S
v
a
ri
a
b
le
.
S
ee
T
a
b
le
5
n
o
te
s.
A
v
er
a
g
e
v
a
lu
es
a
re
n
o
n
-w
ei
g
h
te
d
a
ri
th
m
et
ic
m
ea
n
s.
848 R. White
D
ow
nl
oa
de
d 
By
: [
W
hi
te
, R
og
er
] A
t: 
11
:3
7 
2 
M
ay
 2
00
7 
nations with the largest projected annual increases in
trade volume with the US are China ($681 million),
Nigeria ($281 million) and India ($258 million).
Tanzania ($1.7 million), Senegal ($1.8 million) and
Sierra Leone ($1.9 million) have the smallest
projected increases.
To calculate annual per-immigrant effects,
estimated aggregate trade increases presented in
Table 5 are employed and numerical values for each
nation in terms of a 10% increase in immigrants.
I divide the former by the latter and, in Table 6, we
see the average immigrant adds $910 to US exports to
and between $910 and $2967 to imports from country
j due to network effects. Each immigrant adds up to
$2057 to US imports from country j due to
transplanted home bias. Thus, the average immigrant
adds $3878 to the US-country j volume of trade.18
China ($11 442), Bangladesh ($10 724) and Nigeria
($6252) have the largest per-immigrant effects.
Emigration from Vietnam ($164), Guyana ($473)
and Nicaragua ($718) increase trade the least.
V. Conclusion
The empirical analysis provides results that buttress
and extend prior research. Immigration is a signifi-
cant determinant of US-home country trade, with
network effects and transplanted home bias both
displayed. However, contrary to earlier research that
either did not consider heterogeneity in immigrant-
trade links across home country income classifica-
tions or was restricted in its analysis due to data
limitations, the observed US immigrant-trade link is
found to be driven by immigrants from low income
countries. As the data employed spans a lengthier
time period and includes more trading partners than
prior research, the estimates presented here are taken
as more reliable and thus to yield more accurate
aggregate and per-immigrant trade effects.
For the typical low income country, a 10%
immigrant stock increase leads to 4.66 and 1.47%
increases in US imports from and exports to the
home country, respectively. Decomposition of the
link into operative channels results in lower and
upper bound estimates of aggregate and per-immi-
grant trade effects resulting from hypothetical 10%
immigrant stock increases. The average low income
home country immigrant increases annual imports
from the home country by up to $2057 due to
transplanted home bias and by $910 to $2967 due
to network effects. The same immigrant adds an
additional $910 to annual exports to the home
country as a result of network effects.
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Appendix A: Variable listing
Variable Description Source(s)
Immigrantsijt Number of immigrants from country j in the US
at time t.
US Census; US INS
Volume of Tradeijt Volume of trade between the US and country j at
time t. Calculated as Volume of
Tradeijt¼ (ImportsijtþExportsijt).
Feenstra et al. (2002); US ITC Trade Database
Importsijt Imports (c.i.f.) from j to US at time t. ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘
Exportsijt Exports (f.o.b.) to j from US at time t. ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘
GDPjt Gross Domestic Product of country j at time t. World Development Indicators CD-ROM
Exchange Rateijt US-country j exchange rate expressed as units of
foreign currency per US dollar at time t.
IMF IFS; Online: www.oanda.com
Distanceij Distance (in kilometers) between foreign nation’s
capital city and US
Author’s calculations (Great Circle method)
FDI_OUTijt Measure of US-owned assets in country j at time t. US BEA
FDI_INijt Measure of country j-owned assets in the US at
time t.
‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘ ‘‘
GDP per capitajt Measure of average income in country j during year t. 2003 World Development Indicators CD-ROM
FTAijt Dummy variable equal to 1 if the nation is in a Free
Trade Agreement (for more than six months in a
calendar year) with the US; 0 otherwise.
n.a.
Languagej Dummy variable equal to 1 if the official language of
the nation is English; 0 otherwise.
Crystal (1993)
Militaryijt Dummy variable equal to 1 if US military action
occurred involving country j during year t; 0
otherwise.
n.a.
OECDjt Dummy variable equal to 1 if nation is a member of
the OECD (for more than six months in a year); 0
otherwise.
Online: www.oecd.org
OPECjt Dummy variable equal to 1 if the nation is a member
of OPEC (for more than six months in any year); 0
otherwise.
Online: www.opec.org
Sanctionsijt Dummy variable equal to 1 if sanctions were imposed
against country j by the US in year t, 0 otherwise.
Elliot et al. (Forthcoming, 2005)
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Appendix C: Listing of US-imposed economic sanctions, 1980–2001
Country Year(s) US Foreign policy objective(s)
Argentina 1980–83 Improve of human rights; Adhere to nuclear safeguards.
Bolivia 1980–82 Improve of human rights; Deter drug trafficking.
Brazil 1980–84 Improve of human rights; Adhere to nuclear safeguards.
China 1989–98 Improve human rights; End nuclear proliferation.
Colombia 1996–98 Stop narcotics trade; Improve human rights.
Ecuador 1995–98 End border conflict with Peru.
El Salvador 1980–81; 1987–88; 1990–93 1980–1981 and 1990–1993: Improve human rights. 1987–1988: Reverse
amnesty decision.
Ethiopia 1980–92 Settle expropriation claims; Improve human rights.
Guatemala 1993; 1996–98 Restore democracy, oppose coup.
Haiti 1987–94; 1996–98; 2001 Improve human rights; Restore democracy; Stop drug smuggling.
India 1980–82 Adhere to nuclear safeguards.
Indonesia 1991–2001 Improve human rights; End conflict, human rights violations in East Timor.
Iran 1980–81; 1984–2001 1979–1981: Release hostages; Settle expropriation claims. 1984–1997: End war
with Iraq; Halt attacks on Gulf shipping; End support for terrorism.
Israel 1980–83 Withdraw from Sinai; Push Palestinian autonomy talks.
Jordan 1990–97 Enforce UN embargo vs. Iraq.
Nicaragua 1981–90; 1992–95 End support for El Salvador rebels; Destabilize Sandinista government;
Implement civil control over security forces; Settle expropriation claims.
Nigeria 1993–98 Improve human rights; Establish democracy; Stop flow of narcotics.
Pakistan 1980–2000 Adhere to nuclear safeguards.
Panama 1987–90 Destabilize Noriega regime.
Peru 1991–98 Improve human rights; Establish democracy; End conflict with Ecuador.
Romania 1983–93 Improve human rights; Establish democracy.
S. Africa 1985–91 End apartheid.
Syria 1986–2001 End support of terrorism.
Thailand 1991–92 Restore constitutional regime.
Vietnam 1980–98 Return of members/remains of the US Armed Forces classified as Missing
In Action; restrictions on emigration.
Note: These listings are not comprehensive and only present US military interventions and US-imposed economic sanctions
during the period 1980 through 2001 involving a trading partner listed in Table 2.
Appendix B: Listing of US military interventions, 1980–2001
Country Year(s) Description
Bolivia 1986 Provided logistical support against coca-processing facilities.
El Salvador 1981–92 Demonstrated support for El Salvador during elections, deterred
Nicaraguan aggression, advised Salvadoran forces, provided
over-flights to aid anti-rebel war.
Haiti 1994–96 Over 20,000 US troops deployed. Returned Aristide regime to
power, trained police force and judiciary, assisted the
rehabilitation of the civil administration.
Honduras 1983–89 US military conducted maneuvers and built bases near borders.
Iran 1980 Aborted bombing raid to rescue embassy hostages.
Iran 1984; 1987–88 1984: US Air Force jets shot down two Iranian jets over Persian
Gulf. 1987–1988: Iraqi-launched missile strike against the USS
Stark followed by US claim that Iran had escalated war. US
intervened on side of Iraq.
Nicaragua 1981–90 Navy command operation. CIA directed exile invasions, planted
harbor mines. Assistance provided to Nicaraguan Resistance.
Trade embargo imposed (1985).
Panama 1989–90 27 000 US troops deployed. President Noriega captured,
Nationalist government ousted; established US-recognized
government.
Philippines 1989 US military evacuated Americans, protected US interests,
Marines guarded US embassy, US Air Force patrolled above
Manila and rebel air bases.
852 R. White
